Exam 4 Study Guide
This guide covers two chapters. Chapter 7 follows a memory from your senses to a courtroom. Chapter 8 looks at how we think, talk, and measure the mind. Work one chapter at a time. Read the "what to know" part first. Then cover the right side of each table and rebuild it from memory. Say the sequences out loud, in order. Finish each chapter with its ten self-test items. The cram sheet at the end puts every name, number, and rule in one place.
What this guide covers
- Chapter 7 · encoding, storage, and retrieval; the three memory stores; working memory; levels of processing and study methods that work; explicit and implicit memory and the brain parts behind them; recall, cues, and the serial position effect; forgetting; and why eyewitness memory fails.
- Chapter 8 · concepts and prototypes; algorithms, heuristics, and roadblocks; the four big judgment biases; the building blocks of language and how children learn it; theories of intelligence; IQ tests, reliability, and validity; and nature and nurture.
Chapter 7Memory
What to know
Memory is not a video camera. It is a set of three jobs. Encoding gets information in. Storage keeps it. Retrieval gets it back out. When you "can't remember," one of the three has failed. Your first task on any question is to ask which one.
The multi-store model comes from Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968). It has three stores. Sensory memory holds a near-exact copy of what your senses take in. It is huge but very brief. The visual part, iconic memory, lasts about a quarter of a second. The sound part, echoic memory, lasts three to four seconds. Sperling (1960) showed that we hold more than we can report before it fades.
Attention is the gate. Only what you attend to moves into short-term memory. Short-term memory lasts about 15 to 30 seconds if you do nothing with it. It holds about four chunks. Miller's classic estimate (1956) was seven, plus or minus two. Chunking groups items into bigger units, so you can hold more. Rehearsal and deep encoding move items into long-term memory, which has no known limit.
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) renamed the middle store working memory. It is a workbench, not a shelf. A central executive directs attention. The phonological loop holds sounds and words. The visuospatial sketchpad holds pictures and places.
Some encoding is automatic. You store place, time, and how often things happen without trying. Most school learning is effortful. Maintenance rehearsal is plain repeating. It keeps an item alive for now. Elaborative rehearsal links new material to what you know. It builds lasting memory. Craik and Lockhart (1972) called this the levels-of-processing effect. Shallow (structural) processing looks at letters. Middle (phonemic) processing looks at sound. Deep (semantic) processing looks at meaning. Deep wins, even with the same study time.
Four study methods have strong support. Use spacing: spread study over days. Use the testing effect: quiz yourself instead of re-reading. Use the self-reference effect: tie facts to your own life. Use mnemonics for lists that have no built-in order.
Long-term memory has two big branches. Explicit (declarative) memory is what you can bring to mind and say. Tulving split it into semantic memory (facts) and episodic memory (events you lived). Implicit (nondeclarative) memory shows in what you do. It includes procedural skills, classical conditioning, and priming.
Different brain parts run different systems. The hippocampus forms new explicit memories and helps consolidate them. The amygdala adds emotion. The cerebellum holds conditioned reflexes. The basal ganglia hold skills and habits. Old explicit memories are spread across the cortex. Patient H.M. proved the split. In 1953 he lost much of his hippocampus on both sides. After that he could not form new explicit memories (anterograde amnesia). Yet he still learned a mirror-tracing skill. At the cell level, long-term potentiation (LTP) is thought to store memories.
Getting memories out takes two main forms. Recall means producing the answer with no help. Recognition means picking it from choices, which is easier. Relearning shows savings: you learn it faster the second time. Retrieval cues work best when they match the learning setting. This is encoding specificity. Godden and Baddeley's divers (1975) showed context-dependent memory. A large 2021 repeat found a smaller effect. Mood and inner state can act as cues too. The serial position effect means we remember the first items (primacy) and last items (recency) of a list best.
Ebbinghaus (1880s) drew the forgetting curve. Memory falls fast, then levels off. We forget in four ways. Encoding failure: it was never stored. Storage decay: it faded from disuse. Retrieval failure: it is there but out of reach. Interference: memories compete. Proactive means old blocks new. Retroactive means new blocks old.
Memory is reconstructive. Bartlett showed we rebuild memories to fit our schemas. Loftus showed the misinformation effect. In Loftus and Palmer (1974), "smashed" instead of "hit" raised speed guesses and led to false memories of broken glass. Suggestion can even plant whole false memories. For eyewitnesses, watch for leading questions, weapon focus, stress, and the cross-race effect. Confidence tracks accuracy mainly at a first, fair, double-blind lineup. After feedback, confidence rises but accuracy does not. Mistaken identification played a part in about 70% of U.S. convictions later overturned by DNA.
- Encoding is in. Storage is keep. Retrieval is out.
- Sensory: huge, under a second (iconic) to 3 or 4 seconds (echoic). Short-term: about 4 chunks, 15 to 30 seconds. Long-term: no known limit.
- Attention moves items from sensory to short-term memory.
- Meaning beats repetition. Elaborative beats maintenance rehearsal.
- Explicit = semantic + episodic. Implicit = procedural + conditioning + priming.
- Hippocampus: new explicit memories. Amygdala: emotion. Cerebellum and basal ganglia: implicit.
- Proactive: old blocks new. Retroactive: new blocks old.
- Confidence counts only at the first fair identification.
The three stores, drawn
The stores worth memorizing
| Store | How long | How much | Key name |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sensory: iconic | About 0.25 s | Very large | Sperling (1960) |
| Sensory: echoic | 3 to 4 s | Very large | Sperling (1960) |
| Short-term / working | 15 to 30 s without rehearsal | About 4 chunks (classic 7 ± 2) | Miller (1956); Cowan; Baddeley and Hitch (1974) |
| Long-term | Minutes to a lifetime | No known limit | Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) |
Long-term memory, mapped
Why we forget, side by side
| Cause | What went wrong | Clue in the question |
|---|---|---|
| Encoding failure | Never stored | "never paid attention," a coin's design |
| Storage decay | Faded from disuse | "years without using it" |
| Retrieval failure | Stored but out of reach | "tip of the tongue," "came back later" |
| Proactive interference | Old blocks new | old code, old address keeps popping up |
| Retroactive interference | New blocks old | new number makes you lose the old one |
The forgetting curve, drawn
Sequences, in order
- A memory's trip: input → sensory memory → attention → short-term/working memory → encoding → long-term memory → retrieval back to working memory.
- Levels of processing, shallow to deep: structural (looks) → phonemic (sound) → semantic (meaning).
- The serial position curve: high at the start (primacy) → low in the middle → high at the end (recency). A delay with distraction wipes out recency only.
- The forgetting curve: steep drop in the first hours → slower drop over days → levels off.
- A fair lineup: double-blind administrator → tell the witness the culprit may be absent → record confidence right away → no feedback.
How to reason through the question types
Question type 1 · which memory system is this?
A question describes a memory and asks you to name its type.
Step 1 · can the person say it?If yes, it is explicit. If it only shows in what they do, it is implicit.
Step 2 · if explicit, is it tied to a moment?A time and place means episodic. A plain fact means semantic.
Step 3 · if implicit, what kind?A skill is procedural. A learned reflex is conditioning. A faster response after a recent exposure is priming.
Step 4 · name the brain part if askedNew explicit memory needs the hippocampus. Skills use the basal ganglia. Conditioned reflexes use the cerebellum.
Question type 2 · why did they forget?
Example: "Ana moved and keeps giving her old phone number." Which cause of forgetting is this?
Step 1 · was it ever stored?Yes. She learned the new number. So it is not encoding failure.
Step 2 · is something competing?Yes. The old number keeps pushing in. That is interference.
Step 3 · which way is the push?Old is blocking new. That is proactive interference. If the new number had wiped out the old one, it would be retroactive.
Question type 3 · should we trust this witness?
Step 1 · check what happened after the eventLeading questions, news coverage, or feedback can add details.
Step 2 · check the viewing conditionsA weapon, stress, a brief look, or a face of another race all lower accuracy.
Step 3 · check when confidence was measuredConfidence at a first, fair, double-blind lineup is a useful sign. Confidence in court, after feedback, is not.
- Mixing up iconic and echoic. Icon is an image, about 0.25 s. Echo is a sound, 3 to 4 s.
- Saying STM holds "exactly seven." Miller said seven, plus or minus two. Today's estimate is about four chunks.
- Thinking repetition is deep. Plain repeating is maintenance rehearsal. It is shallow.
- Flipping proactive and retroactive. Pro = forward: old pushes forward into new. Retro = backward: new pushes back into old.
- Saying H.M. lost all memory. He kept old memories and implicit learning. He lost the ability to form new explicit memories.
- Trusting a confident witness. Confidence after feedback does not track accuracy.
Chapter 7 self-test · ten items
Chapter 8Thinking, Language & Intelligence
What to know
A concept is a mental group of things that share features. Natural concepts come from daily life and have fuzzy edges. Artificial (formal) concepts have a fixed rule, like a triangle. Eleanor Rosch showed that each concept has a prototype, its most typical member. A robin is a typical bird. A penguin is at the edge. Concepts link into schemas, which hold what we expect. A script, or event schema, is the usual order of events, like at a restaurant.
An algorithm is a step-by-step method that always works if followed. It is sure but slow. A heuristic is a shortcut. It is fast but not guaranteed. Working backward and means-ends analysis are useful heuristics. Trial and error and insight are two other routes. Two habits block good solutions. Mental set means using an old method when a simpler one exists. Luchins's water jar problems (1942) showed it. Functional fixedness means seeing an object only in its usual role.
Tversky and Kahneman showed that heuristics make predictable errors. The availability heuristic judges how common something is by how easily examples come to mind. Vivid news makes rare risks feel common. The representativeness heuristic judges by how much something looks like a prototype. It leads people to ignore the base rate. It also causes the conjunction fallacy, as in the Linda problem. Confirmation bias means looking for evidence that fits what you already believe. Wason's studies showed people rarely test ideas in a way that could prove them wrong. The framing effect means the same facts, worded as a gain or a loss, change the choice.
Language is built in layers. Phonemes are the smallest sounds that can change meaning. English has about 44. Morphemes are the smallest units of meaning. "Cats" has four phonemes and two morphemes. Semantics is meaning. Grammar is the set of rules, and syntax is the part about word order. Thanks to generativity, we can make endless new sentences.
Children move through the same stages around the world. They coo at 2 to 4 months and babble at about 6 months. They say one word at a time at about 12 months. Telegraphic speech ("want cookie") comes at 18 to 24 months. Overregularization ("goed") shows the child has learned a rule. Skinner said language is learned by copying and reinforcement. Chomsky said children are born with a language acquisition device and a universal grammar. Today's view blends both, with a sensitive critical period. Linguistic relativity (Sapir-Whorf) is real but modest.
Intelligence is the ability to learn from experience, solve problems, and adapt. Spearman used factor analysis and proposed one general factor, g. Cattell split fluid intelligence (reasoning with new problems, which peaks in early adulthood) from crystallized intelligence (built-up knowledge, which grows with age). Thurstone named seven primary abilities. Gardner proposed eight multiple intelligences, but the theory has weak test support. It is not the same as "learning styles," which careful studies have not supported. Sternberg's triarchic theory has analytical, creative, and practical parts. Emotional intelligence (Salovey and Mayer; Goleman) is noticing, understanding, using, and managing emotions.
In 1905, Binet and Simon built the first practical test to find children who needed help. It used mental age. Terman made the Stanford-Binet and used the IQ formula: mental age divided by real age, times 100. Wechsler (WAIS, WISC) uses a deviation IQ on a normal distribution. The average is 100 and the standard deviation is 15. About 68% score from 85 to 115, and about 95% from 70 to 130.
A good test needs reliability (consistency) and validity (measuring the right thing). A test can be reliable but not valid. It cannot be truly valid without being reliable. Both depend on standardization and good norms. Twin studies put the heritability of IQ near 0.4 to 0.5 in childhood and 0.6 to 0.8 in adults. Heritability describes differences within a group, not a single person. The Flynn effect and stereotype threat show that environment matters too.
- Algorithm: sure but slow. Heuristic: fast but not sure.
- Availability = easy to recall. Representativeness = looks like the type, ignores base rates.
- Confirmation bias = hunting for agreement. Framing = wording changes the choice.
- Phoneme = sound. Morpheme = meaning. Syntax = word order.
- Skinner = reinforcement. Chomsky = inborn language acquisition device.
- Fluid peaks early. Crystallized grows with age.
- Reliable = consistent. Valid = accurate. Reliable does not mean valid.
- Heritability is about a group, never one person.
The four biases worth memorizing
| Bias | The shortcut | Classic example | Clue word |
|---|---|---|---|
| Availability | How easily cases come to mind | Fearing plane crashes after news coverage | "vivid," "in the news," "recent" |
| Representativeness | How much it looks like the type | Shy Steve must be a librarian | "fits the stereotype," base rate ignored |
| Confirmation bias | Look for what fits your belief | Noticing only the coworker's snubs | "already believed," "ignored the rest" |
| Framing effect | Wording as gain or loss | "90% lean" beats "10% fat" | same facts, different words |
Theories of intelligence worth memorizing
| Theory | Theorist | Core idea | Watch out |
|---|---|---|---|
| General intelligence (g) | Spearman (1904) | One factor under all abilities | Based on test scores going together |
| Fluid vs. crystallized | Cattell | New reasoning vs. built-up knowledge | Fluid peaks early; crystallized grows |
| Primary mental abilities | Thurstone | Seven abilities, not one | Rejected the single number |
| Multiple intelligences | Gardner | Eight separate intelligences | Weak test support; not learning styles |
| Triarchic | Sternberg | Analytical, creative, practical | Practical = street smarts |
| Emotional intelligence | Salovey and Mayer; Goleman | Notice, use, understand, manage emotions | Hard to measure well |
The bell curve, drawn
Reliability and validity, drawn
Sequences, in order
- Language, small to big: phoneme (sound) → morpheme (meaning) → word → sentence (grammar and syntax).
- Language development: cooing (2 to 4 months) → babbling (about 6 months) → one word (about 12 months) → telegraphic speech (18 to 24 months) → fast grammar growth and overregularization (2 to 3 years).
- The history of IQ tests: Binet and Simon (1905, mental age) → Terman (Stanford-Binet, ratio IQ) → Wechsler (WAIS and WISC, deviation IQ).
- Heritability of IQ with age: about 0.4 to 0.5 in childhood → about 0.6 to 0.8 in adulthood (the Wilson effect).
How to reason through the question types
Question type 1 · name the bias
Example: "After seeing three news stories about lottery winners, Jon buys 20 tickets, sure he will win."
Step 1 · is there a belief being defended?No. Jon is not filtering evidence for an old belief. So it is not confirmation bias.
Step 2 · did the wording change?No. Nobody reframed the odds. So it is not framing.
Step 3 · is he judging by resemblance or by recall?Vivid winners come easily to mind. That is the availability heuristic.
Question type 2 · compute an IQ
Example: "A 6-year-old has a mental age of 9. What is the ratio IQ?"
Step 1 · set up the formulaIQ = mental age ÷ real age × 100.
Step 2 · fill it in9 ÷ 6 = 1.5. Then 1.5 × 100 = 150.
Step 3 · know the modern twistToday's tests use a deviation IQ instead. It compares you to people your age on a bell curve with a mean of 100 and an SD of 15.
Question type 3 · reliable, valid, or both?
Step 1 · does it give the same result again?If yes, it is reliable.
Step 2 · does it predict or match what it should?If scores line up with grades or job success, it has validity.
Step 3 · remember the one-way ruleReliable can be not valid. A test that is not reliable cannot be valid.
- Mixing availability with representativeness. Availability is about memory ("I can think of examples"). Representativeness is about resemblance ("it fits the type").
- Counting letters or syllables as morphemes. "Banana" has three syllables but one morpheme.
- Treating heritability as a personal number. It describes a group. It says nothing about one person or about group differences.
- Calling multiple intelligences "learning styles." They are different ideas, and learning styles have not held up.
- Thinking a consistent test must be accurate. A scale that is always five pounds off is reliable and wrong.
- Putting Chomsky on the reinforcement side. Skinner is reinforcement. Chomsky is the inborn device.
Chapter 8 self-test · ten items
One pageCram sheet
Numbers to know cold
| Number | What it is |
|---|---|
| About 0.25 s | Iconic (visual) memory |
| 3 to 4 s | Echoic (sound) memory |
| 15 to 30 s | Short-term memory without rehearsal |
| 7 ± 2; about 4 | STM capacity: Miller's classic estimate; today's estimate in chunks |
| About 70% | Share of DNA-overturned U.S. convictions where mistaken eyewitness identification played a part |
| About 44 | Phonemes in English |
| 100 and 15 | IQ mean and standard deviation |
| 68, 95, 99.7 | Percent within 1, 2, and 3 SD of the mean |
| 0.4 to 0.5; 0.6 to 0.8 | Heritability of IQ in childhood; in adulthood |
People and the idea that goes with them
| Person | Idea |
|---|---|
| Atkinson and Shiffrin | Multi-store model (1968) |
| Sperling | Sensory memory holds more than we can report (1960) |
| Miller; Cowan | 7 ± 2; about 4 chunks |
| Baddeley and Hitch | Working memory (1974) |
| Craik and Lockhart | Levels of processing (1972) |
| Tulving | Semantic vs. episodic memory |
| H.M. (Henry Molaison) | Hippocampus needed for new explicit memory |
| Kandel | Synapses and learning in Aplysia; Nobel 2000 |
| Ebbinghaus | Forgetting curve; savings |
| Godden and Baddeley | Divers and context-dependent memory (1975) |
| Bartlett | Memory is rebuilt to fit schemas |
| Loftus and Palmer | Misinformation effect: "smashed" vs. "hit" (1974) |
| Rosch | Prototypes |
| Luchins | Water jars and mental set (1942) |
| Tversky and Kahneman | Availability, representativeness, framing |
| Wason | Confirmation bias |
| Skinner; Chomsky | Reinforcement; language acquisition device |
| Spearman; Cattell; Thurstone | g; fluid vs. crystallized; seven primary abilities |
| Gardner; Sternberg | Multiple intelligences; triarchic theory |
| Salovey and Mayer; Goleman | Emotional intelligence; made it popular |
| Binet and Simon; Terman; Wechsler | Mental age (1905); Stanford-Binet; WAIS and WISC |
| Flynn; Steele | Rising IQ scores; stereotype threat |
Definitions worth having word-perfect
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Encoding specificity | Cues work best when they match the learning conditions |
| Consolidation | Steadying a new memory for long-term storage |
| Long-term potentiation | Lasting strengthening of links between neurons that fire together |
| Misinformation effect | Later misleading information changes the memory of an event |
| Mental set | Using a method that worked before when a simpler one exists |
| Functional fixedness | Seeing an object only in its usual role |
| Base rate | How common something really is |
| Morpheme | Smallest unit of meaning |
| Phoneme | Smallest unit of sound that can change meaning |
| Telegraphic speech | Two-word stage with small words dropped |
| Reliability | Consistency of a test |
| Validity | Whether a test measures what it claims |
| Standardization | Same giving and scoring every time, compared with norms |
| Heritability | Share of differences in a group linked to genetic differences |