APPLIED ETHICS · STUDY GUIDE

Exam 2 Study Guide

This guide covers the two theories that most often collide in practice. Chapter 3 asks what outcome is best, and how institutions count it. Chapter 4 asks what we may never do to a person, whatever the outcome. Work one chapter at a time. Read the "what to know" paragraphs, copy the tables out by hand, then try each worked case with the steps covered. Finish each chapter with its self-test.

WHAT THIS GUIDE COVERS

- Chapter 3 · the parts of utilitarianism, Bentham and Mill, the felicific calculus, three theories of well-being, adaptive preferences, act and rule utilitarianism, expected value, the five objections, QALYs, DALYs and triage.
- Chapter 4 · constraints and the paradox of deontology, the good will, hypothetical and categorical imperatives, Universal Law and Humanity, perfect and imperfect duties, Ross's prima facie duties, the murderer at the door, double effect, thresholds and the Nuremberg Code.

CHAPTER 3

Consequentialism and Utilitarianism

Read it in full: **Chapter 3 in the textbook**. Practice it in the lab: **Build a Consequentialism** and **The QALY Desk**.

What to know

Consequentialism says only outcomes make an act right. Intentions and the kind of act matter only as they affect outcomes. **Utilitarianism** is one species. Classical utilitarianism adds **welfarism** (only well-being makes an outcome good) and **impartial aggregation** (sum well-being across everyone, each counted equally). "Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one" is Mill's phrasing of a commitment he credited to Bentham.

Change one part and you get another consequentialism. Drop welfarism for pluralistic or ideal consequentialism (Moore, 1903: beauty and affection are good in themselves). Replace summing

and you get prioritarianism, maximin or egalitarianism. Drop maximizing and you get satisficing. Deny impartiality and you get egoism or partialist views. Find which part an objection targets.

Jeremy Bentham (1748 to 1832) was a legal reformer. His Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (printed 1780, published 1789) names pain and pleasure as our "two sovereign masters." Impartiality made the theory radical: he wrote against slavery, for animal welfare (the question is whether they can suffer), for decriminalizing homosexual acts (essay c. 1785, published 1978) and for votes for women (plan written 1809, published 1817).

John Stuart Mill (1806 to 1873), in Utilitarianism (serialized 1861, book 1863), said pleasures differ in kind. **Higher pleasures** of intellect and moral feeling beat lower ones, judged by competent judges who know both: better a human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. Critics say this smuggles in a non-hedonic standard.

Bentham's **felicific calculus** has seven dimensions: intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity and extent. As literal math it fails, but its pieces live on in utility weights, probabilities, discount rates and population denominators.

Three theories of **well-being** (Parfit, 1984). **Hedonism**: pleasure minus pain; Nozick's experience machine (1974) is its problem. **Preference satisfaction**: getting what you want; trouble with mistaken, malicious and **adaptive preferences** (Elster, 1983). **Objective list**: health, knowledge, friendship, autonomy; the charge is paternalism. Sen showed deprived groups often report good health (Bengal widows, 1944; Kerala versus Bihar). Triangulate self-reports with objective indicators.

Act utilitarianism judges each act by its outcome. **Rule utilitarianism** (Brandt coined the term in 1959; Hooker, 2000) judges acts by rules whose general acceptance would be best. Smart's **collapse objection**: refine the rule enough and it becomes act utilitarianism; refuse and it is rule worship. Hooker replies that codes must be teachable, so the best code is simpler. Hare's two-level view (1981): a theory can be a **criterion of rightness** without being a **decision procedure**.

Under uncertainty use **expected value**: multiply each outcome by its probability and sum. An act is **objectively right** if it actually produces the best outcome and **subjectively right** if it maximizes expected value on the evidence. Blame should track subjective rightness; judging by results alone

is **outcome bias**. Tiny probabilities times huge values raise **Pascal's mugging** (Yudkowsky 2007; Bostrom 2009).

The objections that bite. **Separateness of persons** (Rawls, 1971): summing treats society as one big person. Fix: **prioritarianism** (Parfit, 1991). **Transplant** (Thomson, 1976): killing one healthy patient to save five is wrong though the numbers match the trolley. **Integrity** (Williams, 1973): Jim and the Indians. **Demandingness** (Singer, 1972) erases the supererogatory. The **Repugnant Conclusion** (Parfit, 1984): a vast population barely worth living beats ten billion flourishing lives on the total view. These are managed, not refuted.

In practice: one **QALY** is a year in full health. Cost per QALY is extra cost divided by extra QALYs. NICE (created 1999) used about £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY from 2004; in late 2025 the range was announced to rise to £25,000 to £35,000. The **DALY** (World Bank, 1993) counts healthy years lost, so lower is better. The disability critique: weights below 1.0 value disabled lives less, and the **disability paradox** shows people with impairments rate their lives higher than the public does. ACA section 6301 bars PCORI and Medicare coverage decisions from using a dollars-per-QALY threshold. Crisis standards in COVID-19 used SOFA scores; disability exclusions were revised after civil rights complaints.

> **LOCK THESE IN**
>
> - Utilitarianism = consequentialism + welfarism + impartial summing.
> - Bentham: quantity of pleasure, seven dimensions. Mill: higher and lower pleasures.
> - Hedonism, preference satisfaction, objective list: the well-being theory decides who is counted.
> - Adaptive preferences make deprived people report high satisfaction; triangulate.
> - Act versus rule; criterion of rightness versus decision procedure.
> - Expected value = sum of probability times value. Blame tracks subjective rightness.
> - Big five objections: separateness of persons, transplant, integrity, demandingness, Repugnant Conclusion.
> - QALY higher is better; DALY lower is better. Cost per QALY = extra cost / extra QALYs.



Count the area. A QALY multiplies years by a health utility weight. The gain from treatment, divided into its extra cost, gives a cost per QALY that can be set against a funding threshold.

The parts of classical utilitarianism

Component	What it claims	Deny it and you get
Consequentialism proper	Only outcomes decide rightness	Deontology, virtue ethics
Welfarism	Only well-being makes outcomes good	Ideal or pluralistic consequentialism
Impartiality	Everyone's well-being counts equally	Ethical egoism; partialist views
Summing	Maximize the total	Prioritarianism, maximin, egalitarianism
Maximizing	Anything short of best is wrong	Satisficing consequentialism

Key terms and comparisons

Item	Meaning	Note
Hedonism	Well-being is pleasure minus pain	Experience machine (Nozick, 1974)
Preference satisfaction	Getting what you want	Adaptive and uninformed wants
Objective list	Health, knowledge, friendship, autonomy	Capabilities; Human Development Index since 1990
Act utilitarianism	Each act judged by its outcome	Two-level view (Hare, 1981)
Rule utilitarianism	Acts judged by best general rules	Brandt 1959; Hooker 2000; collapse objection
Expected value	Sum of probability times value	Subjective versus objective rightness
Prioritarianism	Benefits to the worse off weigh more	Parfit, 1991
QALY	One year in full health; higher is better	NICE about £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY
DALY	Healthy year lost; lower is better	World Bank, 1993; Global Burden of Disease
Repugnant Conclusion	Vast barely worth living world outranks a flourishing one	Parfit, 1984; total view

Worked cases

WORKED CASE 1 · COST PER QALY

Without a new drug, a patient lives 4 years at utility 0.5. With it, 8 years at 0.8. The drug costs £110,000 more. Find the QALY gain and the cost per QALY, and compare it with the £20,000 to £30,000 range.

STEP 1 · QALYS WITHOUT

$4 \times 0.5 = 2.0$ QALYs.

STEP 2 · QALYS WITH

$8 \times 0.8 = 6.4$ QALYs.

STEP 3 · GAIN

6.4 − 2.0 = **4.4 QALYs**.

STEP 4 · COST PER QALY

£110,000 ÷ 4.4 = **£25,000 per QALY**, inside the range.

WHAT THE NUMBER HIDES

The 0.5 and 0.8 are value judgments, usually drawn from the general public. Change the weights and the verdict can change.

WORKED CASE 2 · EXPECTED VALUE UNDER UNCERTAINTY

Treatment A gives a good result worth +10 with probability 0.9 and a bad result worth −20 with probability 0.1. Treatment B gives a sure +6. Which has the higher expected value? Then suppose the patient on A has the bad result.

STEP 1 · EXPECTED VALUE OF A

(0.9 × 10) + (0.1 × −20) = 9 − 2 = **7**.

STEP 2 · EXPECTED VALUE OF B

1.0 × 6 = **6**.

STEP 3 · CHOOSE

A has the higher expected value, so choosing A is **subjectively right**.

STEP 4 · THE BAD OUTCOME

If the patient gets the −20 result, A was **objectively wrong** in hindsight. Blaming the clinician would be **outcome bias**, since the choice was best on the evidence.

WORKED CASE 3 · HOW A DISABILITY WEIGHT CHANGES THE COUNT

Two patients each gain 20 more years from the same rescue. One will live at utility 1.0. The other has quadriplegia, weighted at 0.6. How many QALYs does each rescue produce, and what is the objection?

STEP 1 · FIRST PATIENT

20 × 1.0 = 20 QALYs.

STEP 2 · SECOND PATIENT

20 × 0.6 = 12 QALYs.

STEP 3 · READ THE RESULT

A QALY-maximizer would favor the first rescue by 8 QALYs.

STEP 4 · THE OBJECTION

The math encodes a judgment that a disabled life is worth less to extend. The **disability paradox** adds that people living with the impairment rate their lives higher than the public weights suggest. This is why US law bars a dollars-per-QALY threshold for Medicare coverage.

WORKED CASE 4 · NAMING THE OBJECTION

A planner says: "Put the cost on a few people, because the total benefit is bigger." Which objection applies, and what fix is on offer?

STEP 1 · WHAT IS BEING SUMMED

Burdens on some are offset by benefits to others.

STEP 2 · NAME IT

Rawls's **separateness of persons**: no one experiences the compensating balance.

STEP 3 · THE UTILITARIAN REPLIES

Diminishing marginal utility often favors spreading benefits, but that is contingent.

STEP 4 · THE STRUCTURAL FIX

Prioritarianism weights gains to the worse off more heavily. It changes the theory rather than defending it whole.

TRAPS PEOPLE FALL INTO

- **Treating consequentialism and utilitarianism as the same.** Utilitarianism is one species, defined by welfarism plus impartial summing.
- **Calling utilitarianism selfish.** It is radically impartial; the usual complaint is that it asks too much.
- **"You can't calculate everything, so it's useless."** That confuses a criterion of rightness with a decision procedure.
- **Judging a decision by its result.** That is outcome bias. Blame tracks expected value on the evidence.
- **Thinking higher QALY numbers are always fair.** The utility weights carry value judgments, including about disability.
- **Mixing up QALY and DALY directions.** More QALYs is better; more DALYs is worse.
- **Saying averaging fixes the Repugnant Conclusion.** It brings its own paradoxes.
- **"The ends justify the means."** Too crude. The real charge is that in rare cases with no side effects, the theory permits too much.

Chapter 3 self-test · ten items

1. Which two claims turn bare consequentialism into classical utilitarianism?

A. Universalizability and respect for persons
B. Higher pleasures and a list of virtues
C. Welfarism and impartial summing of well-being
D. Prima facie duties and moral residue

C. Welfarism and impartial summing of well-being Classical utilitarianism adds that only well-being counts and that it is summed impartially.

2. Who first drew the distinction between higher and lower pleasures?

A. John Stuart Mill
B. Jeremy Bentham
C. G. E. M. Anscombe
D. Henry Sidgwick

A. John Stuart Mill Mill held that pleasures differ in kind, judged by competent judges who know both.

3. Nozick's experience machine is the main problem for which theory of well-being?

A. Objective list
B. Informed preference
C. Prioritarianism
D. Hedonism

D. Hedonism If only the feel of experience mattered, refusing to plug in would be irrational.

4. Why did Sen's data from Kerala and Bihar matter for welfare measurement?

A. They showed hedonism measures pain accurately
B. Self-reports track expectations, not actual health
C. They showed QALYs undercount the elderly
D. They showed rule utilitarianism collapses

B. Self-reports track expectations, not actual health Better served Kerala reports more illness. Adaptive preferences distort satisfaction surveys.

5. What is the collapse objection to rule utilitarianism?

A. Rules can never be taught to or learned by ordinary people
B. Rules ignore all consequences of acts
C. Refining rules with exceptions ends at act utilitarianism
D. Rules count the interests of some people more than others

C. Refining rules with exceptions ends at act utilitarianism Smart argued refinement leads to "maximize utility" and refusing to refine is rule worship.

6. A drug offers +10 with probability 0.8 and −10 with probability 0.2. What is its expected value?

A. 6
B. 8
C. 10
D. 2

A. 6 $(0.8 \times 10) + (0.2 \times -10) = 8 - 2 = 6$.

7. Rawls's separateness of persons objection says utilitarianism errs by what?

A. Counting the suffering of animals as equal to that of persons
B. Refusing to compare the outcomes of different policies at all
C. Giving extra weight to the worst off
D. Treating society as one person whose costs and gains net out

D. Treating society as one person whose costs and gains net out Within a life, cost now for gain later is fine. Across lives, no one experiences the balance.

8. Williams's case of Jim and the Indians mainly presses which objection?

A. The demandingness objection
B. The integrity objection
C. The Repugnant Conclusion
D. The adaptive preference problem

B. The integrity objection Williams accepted that Jim should probably shoot; he objected to treating Jim's revulsion as one more preference.

9. A treatment costs £48,000 more and gains 1.6 QALYs. What is the cost per QALY?

A. £48,000
B. £76,800
C. £30,000
D. £16,000

C. £30,000 £48,000 ÷ 1.6 = £30,000, the top of NICE's long-used range.

10. Which statement about the DALY is correct?

A. It counts years in full health, so higher is better
B. It was created by NICE in 1999 for appraisals
C. It is barred from all use in global health
D. It counts healthy years lost, so lower is better

D. It counts healthy years lost, so lower is better The DALY came from the World Bank's 1993 report and measures burden.

CHAPTER 4

Deontology and the Ethics of Duty

Read it in full: **Chapter 4 in the textbook**. Practice it in the lab: **The Maxim Workshop** and **Ross's Duty Scale**.

What to know

Deontology (Greek deon, duty) holds that rightness is not set by consequences alone. Some acts, such as killing the innocent, lying or using a person as a mere instrument, are wrong in themselves. McCloskey's sheriff (1957), who could frame one innocent man to stop a riot that would kill five, shows the intuition. Bentham coined the word (Deontology, 1834) in another sense; C. D. Broad gave the modern sense in 1930.

Deontologists do care about consequences. They deny only that outcomes are the whole story. **Agent-relative constraints** tell you what you may not do, even to prevent more violations by others. Scheffler (1982) calls this the paradox of deontology. Nagel and Kamm reply that constraints express your relation to the person in front of you, not a quantity of badness to minimize. Most views combine constraints, duties and **options** (room for your own projects), so deontology is less demanding than utilitarianism. Rule following alone is not deontology: rule utilitarianism follows rules for their outcomes.

Kant's Groundwork (1785): nothing is good without qualification except a **good will**. The honest shopkeeper acts **in conformity with** duty but not **from** duty. Motives from inclination or fear are

heteronomous; self-legislation by reason is **autonomy**. Modern Kantians (Herman, Baron) read duty as the limiting condition, not the only felt motive.

A **hypothetical imperative** binds only if you hold the end (if you want to pass, study). A **categorical imperative** binds unconditionally. The **Formula of Universal Law**: act only on a maxim you can will as universal law. A **maxim** is your policy, stated with its reason. Failure comes as a **contradiction in conception** (the lying promise destroys promising) or a **contradiction in the will** (a world with no help is conceivable but you cannot will it). It is a test of consistency, not of bad outcomes, and it is not the golden rule.

The **Formula of Humanity**: treat humanity always as an end, never **merely** as a means. Using the pharmacist is fine; deception and coercion are the paradigm violations, because the person could not share your real maxim. Things have a price; persons have **dignity**. This flows into Article 1 of the German Basic Law (1949) and the 1948 Universal Declaration. The Kingdom of Ends is a third formulation.

Kant's two axes: **perfect** duties (strict, no latitude: do not lie, do not coerce) and **imperfect** duties (adopt an end, with latitude: help others, develop talents), each owed to others or to self. The duty not to deceive a patient is perfect; advocating past your shift is imperfect. Confusing them breeds misconduct or burnout.

W. D. Ross (The Right and the Good, 1930) listed seven **prima facie duties**: fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, non-maleficence. In conflict, one becomes the **duty proper**; the loser leaves **moral residue**. There is no master ranking rule: weighing is judgment (moral intuitionism). Some prefer the term pro tanto.

The **murderer at the door** (Kant, 1797, against Constant) is the most damaging exhibit. Korsgaard (1986) argued Universal Law permits lying to a deceiver and proposed a two-level repair. Also, declining to disclose is not lying: "I will not tell you" is honest.

Trolley cases (Foot 1967; Thomson 1976, 1985): most pull the lever, few push from the footbridge. The **doctrine of double effect** (back to Aquinas) separates intended harm from foreseen harm; its four conditions are a permissible act, good effect intended, harm not the means, and proportionality. The **acts/omissions** distinction says killing is worse than letting die; Rachels

(1975) attacked it. Sykes and Thorns (2003) found titrated opioids do not measurably shorten survival. **Threshold deontology** lets constraints give way at catastrophe; its problem is where the line sits. Anscombe held absolute prohibitions.

In practice: the Nuremberg Code (August 1947) opens with "the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential" and refuses to trade consent for benefit. Tuskegee (1932 to 1972) led to the National Research Act (1974) and the Belmont Report (1979). Hohfeld (1913, 1917) sorted claims, liberties, powers and immunities. Nozick (1974) called rights **side constraints**. Strains: conflicts, rigidity, Anscombe's 1958 worry about law without a lawgiver, and **moral luck** (Williams and Nagel, 1976). A clinic rule of thumb: if you would not tell the patient what you are doing and why, you may be using them merely as a means.

LOCK THESE IN

- Deontology: outcomes are not the only thing that decides rightness.
- Agent-relative constraints bind you even to prevent more violations by others.
- Hypothetical imperatives depend on your ends; the categorical imperative does not.
- Universal Law: contradiction in conception breaks a perfect duty; contradiction in the will breaks an imperfect one.
- Humanity: never merely as a means. Deception and coercion are the paradigm violations.
- Ross: seven prima facie duties, weighed by judgment into a duty proper, leaving residue.
- Double effect: permissible act, good intended, harm not the means, proportionality.
- Nuremberg's first principle: voluntary consent is absolutely essential.



Consistency, not consequences. A maxim that destroys its own practice when universalized breaks a perfect duty. One that is conceivable but cannot be willed breaks an imperfect duty.

Kant's four kinds of duty

Duty	Perfect (no latitude)	Imperfect (latitude)
To self	Do not destroy yourself or degrade your rational agency	Cultivate your talents
To others	Do not lie, make false promises or coerce	Beneficence: contribute to others' ends

Key terms and comparisons

Item	Meaning	Example or source
Hypothetical imperative	Binds only if you hold the end	"If you want to avoid a lawsuit, document"
Categorical imperative	Binds any rational agent unconditionally	"Do not falsify the chart"
Universal Law	Can the maxim be willed as law?	Padding hours free-rides on others' honesty
Humanity	Never merely as a means	Enrolling a patient in a trial without telling them
Ross's seven duties	Fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, non-maleficence	The Right and the Good, 1930
Double effect	Intended harm worse than foreseen harm	Aquinas; palliative opioids
Acts/omissions	Killing worse than letting die	Attacked by Rachels, 1975
Threshold deontology	Constraints yield at catastrophe	Michael Moore; Nozick's "catastrophic moral horror"
Side constraint	Rights bound action; not goals to maximize	Nozick, 1974
Moral luck	Judging by outcomes outside one's control	Williams and Nagel, 1976

Worked cases

WORKED CASE 1 · THE UNIVERSAL LAW TEST

A clerk's maxim: "Whenever I feel underpaid, I will overstate my hours." Run it through the Formula of Universal Law.

STEP 1 · STATE THE MAXIM AS A POLICY

Whenever I feel underpaid, I will report more hours than I worked to get more money.

STEP 2 · UNIVERSALIZE

Everyone who feels underpaid overstates hours.

STEP 3 · TEST FOR CONTRADICTION IN CONCEPTION

Reported hours would no longer be believed. The timekeeping system the padding relies on would collapse. The maxim defeats itself.

STEP 4 · VERDICT

Forbidden, a breach of a perfect duty. The maxim works only as a free ride on everyone else's honesty.

WORKED CASE 2 · ROSS ON A REAL CONFLICT

A patient tells you in confidence he plans to stop his anticoagulant and has not told the prescriber. Work it with Ross.

STEP 1 · LIST THE DUTIES

Fidelity says keep his confidence. Non-maleficence and beneficence say the prescriber should know.

STEP 2 · WEIGH THEM

A serious, specific risk of harm outweighs the confidence here. That becomes the **duty proper**.

STEP 3 · NOTE WHAT KANT GIVES YOU

The perfect duty is not to lie. Silence is not lying, so a strict reading gives little traction.

STEP 4 · HONOR THE RESIDUE

Fidelity is outweighed, not erased. Tell the patient honestly why you are sharing it rather than doing it behind his back.

WORKED CASE 3 · DOUBLE EFFECT AT THE END OF LIFE

A patient in refractory pain at the end of life needs high-dose opioids, which may depress breathing. Check the four conditions.

STEP 1 · IS THE ACT ITSELF PERMISSIBLE?

Giving analgesia is a legitimate act.

STEP 2 · WHAT IS INTENDED?

Pain relief. Death, if it came, would be foreseen, not aimed at.

STEP 3 · IS THE HARM THE MEANS?

No. Comfort does not arrive by way of respiratory depression.

STEP 4 · PROPORTIONALITY

Refractory suffering at the end of life is a grave reason. All four conditions hold.

A CAUTION

Sykes and Thorns (2003) found titrated opioids do not measurably shorten survival, so the doctrine may do less work here than textbooks suggest.

WORKED CASE 4 · LEVER VERSUS FOOTBRIDGE

Explain why most people pull the lever but will not push the man off the footbridge.

STEP 1 · THE COUNTERFACTUAL TEST

If the worker on the side track escaped, would your plan still work? Yes. His death is a **side effect**.

STEP 2 · APPLY IT TO THE FOOTBRIDGE

If the man bounced off unharmed, your plan would fail. His body **is** the plan.

STEP 3 · NAME THE PRINCIPLES

Double effect separates intended from foreseen harm. The Formula of Humanity forbids using a body as a mere tool.

STEP 4 · THE HONEST CAVEAT

Thomson doubted double effect explained the gap. The distinction is defensible but contested.

TRAPS PEOPLE FALL INTO

- **"Deontology ignores consequences."** It denies only that consequences are the sole test of rightness.
- **"Deontology means following rules."** Rule utilitarianism follows rules too, for their outcomes.
- **Reading Universal Law as "what if everyone did that?"** It tests consistency, not a forecast of bad results.
- **Thinking the Formula of Humanity bans using people.** It bans using them merely as means.
- **Treating silence as lying.** Declining to disclose is not deception.
- **Confusing perfect and imperfect duties.** Perfect duties have no latitude; imperfect ones leave room for judgment.
- **Thinking Ross gives a ranking rule.** He denies there is one. Weighing is judgment.
- **Thinking enough benefit could excuse missing consent at Nuremberg.** The Code refuses that trade.

Chapter 4 self-test · ten items

1. Kant's honest shopkeeper charges fair prices only to protect his reputation. What does Kant say?

A. He acts in conformity with duty but not from duty
B. He acts from duty because the outcome is honest
C. He breaks a perfect duty to his customers
D. He follows a categorical imperative of trade

A. He acts in conformity with duty but not from duty The act is right, but the motive is self-interest, so on Kant's view it lacks moral worth.

2. "If you want to pass, study the drug classes." What kind of command is this?

A. A categorical imperative
B. A hypothetical imperative
C. A perfect duty to self
D. A side constraint

B. A hypothetical imperative It binds only while you hold the end of passing.

3. Universalizing the lying promise destroys the practice of promising. Which failure is this?

A. A contradiction in the will
B. A failure of proportionality
C. An instance of moral luck
D. A contradiction in conception

D. A contradiction in conception The maxim cannot even be coherently conceived as a universal law.

4. Which act most clearly violates the Formula of Humanity?

A. Enrolling a patient in a trial without telling them
B. Asking a pharmacist to fill a prescription
C. Paying a taxi driver to take you to the clinic on time
D. Declining to pass on a colleague's private family news

A. Enrolling a patient in a trial without telling them Deception bypasses rational agency. Ordinary use of others with their consent is fine.

5. Which is an imperfect duty in Kant's scheme?

A. Not making promises you cannot keep
B. Not coercing other people by threats
C. Contributing to the ends of others
D. Not lying to a patient

C. Contributing to the ends of others Beneficence is a standing end with latitude in how and when.

6. When Ross's prima facie duties conflict, what settles which wins?

A. A fixed ranking with fidelity at the top
B. Judgment in the particular case
C. The categorical imperative in each case
D. A sum of the expected outcomes

B. Judgment in the particular case Ross denied any master rule; this is moral intuitionism.

7. Korsgaard's 1986 response to the murderer at the door argues what?

A. Kant's 1797 essay was simply misread
B. Lying is always forbidden, without any exception at all
C. Universal Law permits lying to someone who deceives you
D. Only good consequences can ever justify telling the lie

C. Universal Law permits lying to someone who deceives you She offers a two-level repair, not an exegesis.

8. Which is NOT one of the four conditions of double effect?

A. The act itself must be permissible
B. The bad effect must be smaller than any good effect elsewhere
C. The good effect must be the one the agent actually intends
D. The harm must not be the means by which the good comes

B. The bad effect must be smaller than any good effect elsewhere The fourth condition is proportionality: a grave enough reason. It is not a sum across the world.

9. What is the central weakness of threshold deontology?

A. It forbids every act that causes any harm
B. It ignores catastrophic consequences entirely
C. It treats all duties as imperfect duties
D. There is no principled place to set the threshold

D. There is no principled place to set the threshold Once a constraint can be outweighed, it starts to look like a heavy consequentialist weight.

10. Why is the Nuremberg Code called deontological?

A. It makes voluntary consent essential with no benefit override
B. It weighs total benefit against total harm
C. It was drafted by philosophers trained in Kant's moral theory
D. It applies only where national law already requires consent

A. It makes voluntary consent essential with no benefit override Risk is weighed only after consent is secured; consent is never traded for benefit.

ONE PAGE

Cram sheet

Everything from chapters 3 and 4 in one place. Cover the right column and see if you can rebuild each row.

Thinkers and dates

Who	When	Idea
Bentham	1789	Principle of utility; felicific calculus; "can they suffer?"
Mill	1861 (book 1863)	Higher and lower pleasures; competent judges
Kant	1785; 1797	Categorical imperative; murderer at the door
Ross	1930	Seven prima facie duties; duty proper
McCloskey	1957	The sheriff who could frame an innocent man
Brandt; Hooker	1959; 2000	Rule utilitarianism
Smart	1956, 1973	Collapse objection; rule worship
Williams	1973	Integrity; Jim and the Indians
Nozick	1974	Experience machine; side constraints
Thomson	1976	Transplant; trolley variants
Hare	1981	Two-level utilitarianism
Scheffler	1982	Paradox of deontology
Parfit	1984; 1991	Repugnant Conclusion; prioritarianism
Korsgaard	1986	Lying to the murderer; two-level repair

Numbers and formulas

Item	Rule	Note
QALY	Years × utility weight	1.0 = full health; higher is better
Cost per QALY	Extra cost ÷ extra QALYs	NICE about £20,000 to £30,000; announced £25,000 to £35,000 in late 2025
DALY	Healthy years lost	Lower is better; World Bank 1993
Expected value	Sum of (probability × value)	Subjective rightness
Nuremberg Code	Ten principles, August 1947	First: voluntary consent is absolutely essential
Tuskegee	1932 to 1972; about 600 men	Led to the 1974 Act and 1979 Belmont Report

Rules of thumb

Topic	The rule
Which component?	Find which part of utilitarianism an objection targets.
Criterion vs procedure	A theory can define rightness without telling you to calculate.
Outcome bias	Judge the choice by the evidence available, not the result.
Universal Law	Look for a free ride on everyone else's honesty.
Humanity	If you would not tell them what you are doing and why, suspect misuse.
Double effect	Ask whether the plan works if the victim escapes.
Disclosure	Declining to tell is not lying.

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